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Abstract
In this paper we present a recursive method for the computation of dynamic competitive
equilibria in models with heterogeneous agents and market frictions. This method is based on
a convergent operator over an expanded set of state variables. The fixed point of this operator
defines the set of all Markovian equilibria. We study approximation properties of the operator
as well as the convergence of the moments of simulated sample paths. We apply our numerical
algorithm to two growth models, an overlapping generations economy with money, and an asset
pricing model with financial frictions.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we present a recursive method for the computation of sequential competitive equilibria
for dynamic economic models in which the welfare theorems may fail to hold because of the presence
of incomplete agents’ participation, taxes, externalities, incomplete financial markets, and other
financial frictions. These models have become central to analyze the eﬀects of various macroeconomic
policies, the evolution of wealth and income distribution, and the variability of asset prices. However,
computation of their equilibrium solutions may be a formidable task. Indeed, dynamic programming
arguments may fail to apply, and a continuous Markov equilibrium may not exist. Therefore, existing
numerical techniques cannot be readily extended to non-optimal economies.
We shall address the following issues for the computation and simulation of dynamic equilibrium
solutions: (i) Existence: Lack of Markov equilibria. Even though the model may have a recursive
structure, a Markovian equilibrium may not exist — or no Markov equilibrium may be continuous
— over a natural space of state variables. We prove existence of a Markov equilibrium over an ex-
panded state space. (ii) Computation: Non-convergence of the algorithm. Backward iteration over
a candidate equilibrium function may not reach a Markovian equilibrium solution. Contraction ar-
guments underlying dynamic programming methods usually break down for non-optimal economies.
We prove convergence of our algorithm to a fixed-point solution that can generate all sequential
competitive equilibria. Hence, if the model contains multiple equilibria we compute all of them.
(iii) Approximation: Accuracy properties of the computed solution. Approximation errors may cu-
mulate over time. Consequently, as we refine the approximation, we need to ensure that discretized
versions of the algorithm approach an exact solution. Again, contraction arguments cannot be in-
voked to guarantee good approximation properties of the algorithm. We establish convergence of
the computed solution to the set of competitive equilibria. (iv) Simulation: Convergence of the
moments from sample paths. Standard laws of large numbers require certain regularity conditions —
such as continuity of the law of motion — that would be rather imposing for the equilibria of these
economies. We present a discretized method in which the moments from sample paths approach the
set of moments of the invariant distributions of the model.
In dynamic competitive-markets economies with frictions the existence of Markovian equilibria
has been well established under certain monotonicity properties on the equilibrium dynamics [e.g.,
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see Bizer and Judd (1989), Coleman (1991), and Datta, Mirman and Reﬀett (2002)]. But existence
of Markov equilibria remains largely unexplored in many other models in which these monotonicity
conditions may not be satisfied. Regular examples of non-existence of Markovian equilibria have
been found in one-sector growth models with taxes and externalities [Santos (2002)], in exchange
economies with incomplete financial markets [Krebs (2004) and Kubler and Schmedders (2002)], and
in overlapping generations (OLG) economies [Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004)]. For the canonical
one-sector growth model with taxes and externalities, monotonicity conditions follow from fairly mild
restrictions on the primitives, but monotone dynamics are much harder to obtain in multi-sector
models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete financial markets. Duﬃe et al. (1994) dispense
with such monotonicity requirements by expanding the state space with endogenous variables such
as asset prices and individual consumptions. By a suitable randomization of the equilibrium cor-
respondence [Blume (1982)] they then prove the existence of an ergodic invariant distribution for
a wide class of discrete-time infinite-horizon models with exogenous short-sale constraints on as-
set holdings. Building on these methods, Kubler and Schmedders (2003) prove the existence of a
Markovian equilibrium for a class of financial economies with collateral requirements.
We extend this existence result to various types of economies. Our state space includes agents’
shadow values of investment. This choice of the state space seems suitable for computation. The
set of all Markov equilibria can be characterized as the fixed-point solution of a convergent iterative
procedure. (A key factor of convergence is that our operator is acting over candidate equilibrium
sets on a compact domain.) Then, we develop a computable version of the theoretical algorithm.
This numerical algorithm is shown to approximate the original fixed-point solution. Moreover, the
moments derived from the simulated paths of the computed solution converge to a set of moments
of the invariant distributions of the model. We apply our methods to two growth economies, a
stochastic OLG economy with money, and an asset-pricing model with incomplete financial mar-
kets and heterogeneous agents. We illustrate the applicability of our algorithm by comparing our
numerical solution with those generated from some other standard methods. These other methods
may display low accuracy properties, fail to converge to the equilibrium solutions, or capture only
one of the possible existing equilibria.
The computation of competitive equilibria for non-optimal economies has been of considerable in-
terest in macroeconomics and finance [e.g., Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez, and Rios-Rull (2003), Krusell
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and Smith (1998), Heaton and Lucas (1996), and Marcet and Singleton (1999)], but most of this
literature does not deal with the problem of existence of a Markovian equilibrium. Kubler and
Schmedders (2003) refine the analysis of Duﬃe et al. (1994) and develop a reliable computational
algorithm over an expanded state space. However, in the implementation of this algorithm they
iterate over continuous equilibrium functions, and such an iteration process does not guarantee con-
vergence to a fixed-point solution. Also, their state space includes additional variables that seem
hard to compute, and so their algorithm may not be computationally eﬃcient.
The idea of enlarging the state space with the shadow values of investment was first suggested
by Kydland and Prescott (1980) in their seminal study of time inconsistency. Abreu, Pierce and
Stacchetti (APS, 1990) use a similar approach for the computation of sequential perfect equilibria
in which they expand the state space with continuation utility values. The analyses of Kydland
and Prescott and APS have been extended in several directions involving strategic decisions [e.g.,
Atkenson (1991), Chang (1998), Judd, Yeltekin and Conklin (2003), Marcet and Marimon (1998)
and Phelan and Stacchetti (2001)], but none of these papers is concerned with the computation of
sequential equilibria for competitive-market economies with heterogeneous agents. To the best of
our knowledge, the only related paper is Miao (2006) who sets forth a recursive solution method
for the model of Krusell and Smith (1998). However, as in the original APS approach, Miao’s state
space includes expected continuation utilities over the set of sequential competitive equilibria, and
this choice of the state space does not seem operative for the computation of equilibrium solutions
in the present framework.
Finally, for nonoptimal economies convergence properties of numerical algorithms and conver-
gence of the simulated moments remain largely unexplored. As already discussed, Duﬃe et al.
(1994) show existence of an ergodic distribution (which validates a law of large numbers for these
economies). This result is not practical for computational purposes as it is usually hard to locate
the ergodic set. In the absence of continuity of the equilibrium law of motion, other ways to val-
idate laws of large numbers for these economies are to resort to monotonicity assumptions on the
equilibrium dynamics [Santos (2008)] or to artificial expansions of the noise space [Blume (1979)].
These latter approaches seem less attractive for these economies.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we present our general framework and lay out our theoretical
algorithm. Section 3 studies the numerical implementation of our algorithm and its convergence
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properties. Sections 4 to 6 explore the existence and computation of recursive equilibria for various
families of models. We conclude in Section 7.
2 General Theory
In this section, we first set out a general analytic framework that encompasses various competitive
equilibrium models. We then present our numerical approach and main results on existence and
global convergence to the equilibrium correspondence.
2.1 The Analytical Framework
Time is discrete, t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . The state of the economy includes a state vector of endogenous
variables x and vector of exogenous shocks z. Vector x belongs to a compact domain X and contains
all predetermined variables, such as agents’ holdings of physical capital, human capital, and financial
assets. The exogenous state vector follows a Markov chain (zt)t≥0 over a finite set Z. This Markovian
process is described by positive transition probabilities π (z0|z) for all z, z0 ∈ Z. The initial state,
z0 ∈ Z, is known to all agents in the economy. Then zt = (z1, z2, ..., zt) ∈ Zt is a history of shocks,
often called a date-event or node. Let y denote the vector of all other endogenous variables. These
variables could be equilibrium prices or choice variables such as consumption and investment.
In all our models the dynamics of the state vector x is conformed by a system of non-linear
equations:
ϕ (xt+1, xt, yt, zt) = 0. (2.1)
Function ϕ may incorporate technological constraints and individual budget constraints. For some
models, such as the growth models analyzed in Section 4, function ϕ is known and we can explicitly
solve for xt+1 as a function of (xt, yt, zt) . In other applications such as in various models with
adjustment costs, vector xt+1 may not admit an analytical representation.
Let m denote a vector of shadow values of the marginal return to investment for all assets and
all agents. This vector lies in a compact spaceM , and it will be a function of existing variables such
as prices, rates of interest, and marginal utilities and productivities:
mt = h (xt, yt, zt) . (2.2)
4
Let us assume that a sequential competitive equilibrium exists and can be represented by a sequence¡
xt(zt), yt(zt)
¢∞
t=0 satisfying equations (2.1)-(2.2), and the additional system of equations
Φ (xt, yt, zt, Et [mt+1]) = 0, (2.3)
where E [m] is the expectations operator. Function Φ may describe individual optimality conditions
(such as Euler equations), market-clearing conditions, and various types of restrictions such as short-
sales and liquidity requirements. We assume that equations (2.1)-(2.3) fully characterize a sequential
competitive equilibrium, and that ϕ, h, and Φ are continuous functions.
2.2 Recursive Equilibrium Theory
To compute the set of equilibria for the model economy we define the Markovian equilibrium cor-
respondence V ∗ (x, z) containing all the equilibrium vectors m for any given state (x, z) . From this
correspondence V ∗, we can generate recursively the set of sequential competitive equilibria as V ∗ is
the fixed point of an operator B : V 7−→ B(V ) that links state variables to future equilibrium states.
Operator B embodies all equilibrium conditions such as agents’ optimization and market-clearing
conditions from any initial node z to all immediate successor states z+. This operator is analogous
to the expectations correspondence defined in Duﬃe et al. (1994), albeit it is defined over a smaller
set of endogenous variables.
More precisely, let B (V ) (x, z) be the set of all values m = h (x, y, z) satisfying the following
temporary equilibrium conditions: For given x, z there exist y andm+ (z+) ∈ V (x+, z+) with z+ ∈ Z
such that
Φ(x, y, z,
X
z+∈Z
π (z+|z)m+ (z+)) = 0, (2.4)
and
ϕ (x+, x, y, z) = 0.
Note that operator B has a fixed point as a sequential competitive equilibrium is assumed to
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exist. Also, B is monotone in the sense that if V ⊂ V 0 then B(V ) ⊂ B(V 0).1 Moreover, if V has a
closed graph then B(V ) also has a closed graph since the above functions ϕ, h,Φ are all assumed to
be continuous. Indeed, in all our models below operator B preserves compactness.
Assumption 2.1 If V is compact valued, then B(V ) is also compact valued.
Using this assumption we can show existence of a fixed-point solution V ∗, which is globally
convergent for every initial guess V0 ⊃ V ∗. Convergence, should be understood as pointwise conver-
gence2 in the Hausdorﬀ metric [e.g., see Hildenbrand (1974)]. If V ∗ is a continuous correspondence
then convergence will be uniform over all points (x, z).
Theorem 2.1 (convergence) Let V0 be a compact-valued correspondence such that V0 ⊃ V ∗. Let
Vn = B (Vn−1) , n ≥ 1. Then, Vn → V ∗ as n → ∞. Moreover, V ∗ is the largest fixed point of the
operator B, that is, if V = B(V ), then V ⊂ V ∗.
Theorem 2.1 provides the theoretical foundations of our algorithm. The iterative process starts
as follows: For all (x, z) , pick a suﬃciently large compact set V0 (x, z) ⊃ V ∗ (x, z) . Then apply
operator B to V0 and iterate until a desirable level of convergence is attained. This is possible because
limn→∞ Vn equals the equilibrium correspondence V ∗. An important advantage of our approach is
that if multiple equilibria exist, we can find all of them. Finally, under assumption 2.1, by the
measurable selection theorem [see Hildenbrand (1974)] it follows that from operator B we can select
a measurable policy function y = gy(x, z,m), and a transition function m+ (z+) = gm(x, z,m; z+),
for all z+ ∈ Z. These functions give a Markovian characterization of a dynamic equilibrium in the
enlarged state space.
Note that the equilibrium shadow value correspondence V ∗ may not be single-valued; hence,
there could be multiple equilibrium selections in which none of them is continuous. Moreover, there
may not be an equilibrium function y = g (x, z) , and hence a simple recursive equilibrium may
not exist.3 Kubler and Schmedders (2002) construct an example economy with multiple equilibria.
They show that the model does not admit a recursive solution of the form g(x, z):
1For correspondences V, V 0, we say that V ⊂ V 0 if V (x, z) ⊂ V 0 (x, z) for all (x, z).
2Later, we will establish uniform convergence of the simulated moments even though the equilibrium correspondence
V ∗ is only upper semicontinuous.
3Of course, if the competitive equilibrium is always unique then there is a continuous function y = g (x, z).
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Φ(x, g (x, z) , z,
X
z+∈Z
π (z+|z)h (f (x, g (x, z) , z) , g (f (x, g (x, z)) , z+)) = 0, (2.5)
where x+ = f(x, y, z). Kubler and Schmedders (2003) propose a computation procedure to recover
such Markov equilibria numerically by a related expansion of the state space. But their computa-
tional algorithm relies on the assumption that the policy correspondence is a continuous function.
Their algorithm may fail to converge. Our approach overcomes this problem as illustrated by the
various examples in the coming sections.
3 Numerical Implementation
Numerical implementation of our theoretical results requires the construction of a computable al-
gorithm that approximates the fixed point of operator B. In this section, we develop and study
properties of such an algorithm.
We first partition the state space into a finite set of simplices
©
Xj
ª
with non-empty interior
and maximum diameter h. Over this partition we define a family of step correspondences that
take constant values over each Xj . To obtain a computer representation of a step correspondence
we resort to an outer approximation in which each set-value is defined by N elements. Using
these two discretizations we obtain a computable approximation of operator B, which we denote
by Bh,N . By a suitable selection of an initial condition V0, the sequence {V h,Nn+1 } defined recursively
as V h,Nn+1 = B
h,NV h,Nn converges to a limit point V ∗,h,N containing the equilibrium correspondence
V ∗. Moreover, the sequence of fixed points {V ∗,h,N} approaches the equilibrium correspondence
V ∗ as the accuracy of the discretizations goes to the limit. At a later stage, we address the issue
of convergence of the moments obtained from simulations of our numerical approximations. This
problem has been hardly addressed in the literature; again, it has to cope with the fact that the
equilibrium correspondence may not be continuous.
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3.1 The Numerical Algorithm
Let
©
Xj
ª
be a finite family of simplices with non-empty interior such that ∪jXj = X and int(Xj)∩
int(Xi) is empty for every pair Xi,Xj . Define the mesh size h of this discretization as
h = max
j
diam
©
Xj
ª
.
Consider a correspondence V : X × Z → 2M that takes values in space M . Then, its step
approximation V h over the partition
©
Xj
ª
takes constant set-values V h(x, z) on each simplex Xj
and is conformed by the union of sets V (x, z) for x ∈ Xj for given z. That is, for each z
V h(x, z) = ∪x∈XjV (x, z). (3.1)
Accordingly, we can define operator Bh that takes a correspondence V into the step correspondence
[B(V )]h. By similar arguments as above, we can prove that Bh has a fixed-point solution V ∗h. More-
over, we shall soon clarify the sense in which the correspondence V ∗h constitutes an approximation
to V ∗.
We next perform a discretization on the image space. We say that CN (V (x, z)) ⊇ V (x, z) is
an N -element outer approximation of V (x, z) if CN (V (x, z)) can be generated by N elements. In
what follows, we assume that this approximation satisfies a strong uniform convergence property.4
Namely, for any ε > 0, there is 0 < N∗ <∞ such that d[CN (V (x, z)) , V (x, z)] ≤ ε for all N > N∗,
and all V (x, z). For instance, this latter property can be satisfied if the outer approximation is
generated by convex combinations of N points as M is a compact set.
We are now ready to put forward a computable version of operator B. That is, we can define
a new operator Bh,N that sends a correspondence V to the step correspondence [B(V )]h and then
each set-value is adjusted with the N -element outer approximation to get CN ¡[B(V )]h¢. Sections
4 to 6 illustrate examples of such operators, and their application in diﬀerent dynamic models. We
presently show that our discretized operator has good convergence properties: The fixed point of
this operator V ∗,h,N contains the equilibrium correspondence V ∗ and it approaches V ∗ as we refine
the discretizations. The proof of this result extends the convergence arguments of Beer (1980) to a
dynamic setting.
4Again, convergence should be understood in the Hausdorﬀ metric (see opt. cit.).
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Theorem 3.1 For given h, N, and initial condition V0 ⊇ V ∗, consider the recursive sequence
{V h,Nn+1 } defined as V h,Nn+1 = Bh,NV h,Nn . Then, (i) V h,Nn ⊇ V ∗ for all n; (ii) V h,Nn → V ∗,h,N
uniformly as n→∞; and (iii) V ∗,h,N → V ∗ as h→ 0 and N →∞.
The output of our numerical algorithm is summarized by the equilibrium correspondence V h,Nn
from operator Bh,N . By Theorem 3.1, we have that graph[CN
³
[B(V h,Nn )]h
´
] can be made arbitrarily
close to graph[B(V ∗)] for appropriate choices of n, h, and N . We can then choose an approximate
equilibrium selection y = gy,h,Nn (x, z,m), and a transition function m+ (z+) = g
m,h,N
n (x, z,m; z+).
From these approximate equilibrium functions we can generate simulated paths
¡
xt(zt), yt(zt)
¢∞
t=0 .
3.2 Convergence of the Simulated Moments
To assess model’s predictions, analysts usually calculate moments of the simulated paths
¡
xt(zt), yt(zt)
¢∞
t=0
from a numerical approximation. The idea is that the simulated moments should approach steady-
state moments of the original model. Under continuity of the policy function, Santos and Peralta-
Alva (2005) establish various convergence properties of the simulated moments. They also provide
examples of non-existence of stochastic steady-state solutions for non-continuous functions, and lack
of convergence of empirical distributions to some invariant distribution of the model. Hence, it is not
clear how economies with distortions should be simulated, since for these economies the continuity
of the policy function does not usually follow from standard economic assumptions.
We now outline a reliable simulation procedure that circumvents the lack of continuity of the
equilibrium law of motion. We append two further steps to the standard model simulation. First, we
discretize the image space of the approximate equilibrium selection so that this function can take on
a finite number of points. Then, the simulated moments are generated by a finite Markov chain that
has an invariant distribution, and every empirical distribution from the simulated paths converges
almost surely to some ergodic invariant distribution of the Markov chain. Second, following Blume
(1982) and Duﬃe et al. (1994) we randomize over continuation values of operator B. We construct
a new operator Bcv that is a convex-valued correspondence in the space of probability measures.
This correspondence has an invariant distribution μ∗ ∈ Bcv(μ∗). Moreover, as we refine the approx-
imations the simulated moments from our numerical approximations are shown to converge to the
moments of some invariant distribution μ∗.
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(i) Discretization of the equilibrium law of motion: For concreteness, let S = X ×M . Let
χh,Nn : S × Z → S × Z be a selection from graph[CN
³
[B(V h,Nn )]h
´
]. Note that function χh,Nn is
simply defined from the above functions y = gy,h,Nn (x, z,m), and m+ (z+) = g
m,h,N
n (x, z,m; z+) and
the law of motion for the state variable x as given by equation (2.1). Then, χh,Nn gives rise to a
time-homogeneous Markov process (s, z) → s+(z+) for s = (x,m) and all z+ ∈ Z. Now, let Aγ
be a set with a finite number of points in S such that d(Aγ , S) < γ. Therefore, each point in S is
within a γ-ball of some point in A. Let χh,N,Aγn (s, z) = argmins+∈Aγd(s+, χ
h,N
n (s, z)). If there are
various solution points s+ we arbitrarily pick one solution s+. Hence, the new discretized function
χh,N,Aγn takes values in the finite set Aγ ×Z, and gives rise to a Markov chain that has an invariant
distribution ν∗,h,N,Aγn . Further, the moments of a simulated path
¡
st, zt
¢∞
t=0 converge almost surely
to those of some ergodic invariant distribution ν∗,h,N,Aγn [e.g., see Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989),
Ch. 11].
(ii) Randomization over continuation equilibrium sequences: We can view operator B : V ∗ →
V ∗ as a correspondence in the space of probability measures μ on S ×Z. That is, ν ∈ B(μ) if there
is a selection χ of B such that ν = χ · μ, where χ · μ denotes the action of function χ on probability
measure μ [e.g., see Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989)]. Following Blume (1982) and Duﬃe et al.
(1994), we convexify the image of B. Thus, if ν and ν0 are two probability measures that belong to
the range of B, we assume that every convex combination λν + (1− λ)ν 0 also belongs to the range
of B. We let Bcv denote the convexification5 of operator B over the space of probability measures
μ on S×Z. The new operator Bcv is a convex-valued, upper semicontinuous correspondence. Since
S ×Z is assumed to be compact, the set of probability measures μ on S ×Z is also compact in the
weak topology of measures. Therefore, operator Bcv has a fixed-point solution; that is, there exists
an invariant probability, μ∗ ∈ Bcv(μ∗).
(iii) Convergence of the simulated moments to population moments of the model: For given
function χh,N,Aγn and a randomly selected sequence
¡
zt
¢∞
t=0, we generate an approximate equilibrium
path (st)∞t=0. Let f : S × Z → R+ be a function of interest. Then, 1T
PT
t=0 f(st, zt) represents a
simulated moment or some other statistic. Since χh,N,Aγn defines a Markov chain, it follows that
(st, zt)∞t=0 must enter an ergodic set in finite time. Therefore,
1
T
PT
t=0 f(st, zt) must converge almost
5Duﬃe et al. (1994) argue that such convexification amounts to a weak form of sunspot equilibria since the
randomization proceeds over equilibrium distributions rather than over an external parameter or extraneous sunspot
variable.
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surely to
R
f(s, z)dν∗,h,N,Aγn as T → ∞ for some ergodic invariant distribution ν∗,h,N,Aγn . We now
link convergence of invariant distributions ν∗,h,N,Aγn of numerical approximations to some invariant
distribution of the original model μ∗ so that the simulated statistics converge almost surely to those
of some invariant distribution μ∗.
Theorem 3.2 Let
³
ν∗,h,N,Aγn
´
be a sequence of invariant distributions corresponding to functions³
χh,N,Aγn
´
. Then, every limit point of
³
ν∗,h,N,Aγn
´
converges weakly to some invariant distribution
μ∗ ∈ Bcv(μ∗).
To summarize our work in this section, convergence of the simulated moments involves discrete
approximations over the following margins:
1. Discretization of the domain: h mesh size of the family of simplices {Xj}.
2. Discretization of the image: N number of elements in every outer approximation.
3. Finite iterations: n number of iterations over operator Bh,N .
4. Finite Markov chain: γ maximum distance of every point in S to some point in set Aγ .
5. Finite simulations: T length of a simulated path (st, zt)t≥0 .
6. Convexification of equilibrium distributions: Bcv regularized operator in the space of dis-
tributions with a convex image.
Thus, for every  > 0 we can make the aforementioned parameters suﬃciently close to their re-
spective limits so that for a given path (st, zt)∞t=0 generated under function χ
h,N,Aγ
n , there are invari-
ant distributions μ∗, μ0∗ of Bcv such that
R
f(s, z)dμ∗− ≤ 1T
PT
t=0 f(st, zt) ≤
R
f(s, z)dμ0∗+ almost
surely. Therefore, for a suﬃciently fine approximation the moments from simulated paths are close to
the set of moments of the invariant distributions of the model. Of course, ifBcv has a unique invariant
distribution μ∗ then μ0∗ = μ∗ and the above expression reads as
R
f(s, z)dμ∗ −  ≤ 1T
PT
t=0 f(st, zt) ≤R
f(s, z)dμ∗ + .
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4 Non-Optimal Growth Models
In this section, we present a standard stochastic growth model with taxes, heterogeneous agents,
and incomplete markets. This framework comprises several macroeconomic models that are often
simulated by numerical methods. We illustrate the workings of our algorithm in two simple appli-
cations of the model and contrast its performance against standard numerical methods. In the first
application, we study a representative-agent economy with capital income taxes. We show that a
continuous Markov equilibrium may not exist; moreover, standard computation methods would usu-
ally fail to converge or yield inaccurate solutions. In the second application, we consider a stochastic
economy with heterogeneous agents. For our simple parameterization, the competitive equilibrium
is unique, and hence there is a continuous Markovian solution. We compare the solution of our
accurate algorithm with a simplified algorithm that uses an approximate aggregation strategy. We
show that this latter algorithm yields a rather poor approximation of the equilibrium correspondence
and the simulated statistics are strongly biased. Therefore, the first numerical experiment alerts us
of the dangers of using continuous approximations when the true solution may not be continuous,
and the second numerical experiment alerts us of the dangers of using heuristic simplifications as
they may introduce large errors in the equilibrium law of motion.
4.1 Economic Environment
The economy is populated by a finite number of agents, I, who live forever. The vector of shocks
z aﬀects the overall productivity level, as well as individual income and preferences. Capital is the
only asset in this economy, and hence financial markets are technically incomplete.
Each agent i has preferences represented by the intertemporal objective
E
" ∞X
t=0
¡
βi
¢t ui ¡cit, zt¢
#
, (4.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and ct is consumption of the aggregate good at a given node
zt. Function u(·, zt) is increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
Stochastic consumption plans
¡
cit
¢
t≥0 are financed from after-tax capital returns, wages, profits,
and commodity endowments. These values are expressed in terms of the single good, which is taken
as the numeraire commodity of the system at each date-event. For a given rental rate rt and wage
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wt, household i oﬀers kit ≥ 0 units of capital to the production sector, and supplies inelastically
lit(zt) ≥ 0 units of labor. For simplicity, we abstract from leisure considerations.
Each household i is subject to the following sequence of budget constraints
kit+1
¡
zt
¢
+ cit
¡
zt
¢
= (1− δ) kit
¡
zt−1
¢
+ (1− τk(K))rt
¡
zt
¢
kit
¡
zt−1
¢
+ (4.2)
+wt
¡
zt
¢
lit
¡
zt
¢
+ eit
¡
zt
¢
+ T it
¡
zt
¢
+ πi(zt)
kit+1
¡
zt
¢
≥ 0, for all zt = (z0, ..., zt), and ki0 given.
Capital income is taxed according to function τk, which depends on the aggregate capital stock, Kt.
This tax function is assumed to be positive, continuous, and bounded away from 1. Tax revenues
are rebated to consumers as lump-sum transfers T it . Finally, endowments eit(zt) are assumed to be
strictly positive, and πit denotes profits.
The production sector is made up of a continuum of identical units that have access to a constant
returns to scale technology in individual factors. Hence, without loss of generality we shall focus
on the problem of a representative firm. After observing the current shock vector z the firm hires
K units of capital and L units of labor. The total quantity produced of the single aggregate good
is given by a production function AtF (Kt, Lt), where At is the firm’s total factor productivity and
F (Kt, Lt) is the direct contribution of the firm’s inputs to the production of the aggregate good.
Hence, at each date event zt, the representative firm seeks to maximize one-period profits by an
optimal choice of factors (K,L),
πt = max
Kt,Lt
AtF (Kt, Lt)− rtKt − wtLt. (4.3)
Let D1F (K,L) be the derivative of F with respect to K. We shall maintain the following
standard conditions on function F :
Assumption 4.1 F : R+ × R+ → R+ is increasing, concave, continuous, and linearly homoge-
neous. This function is continuously diﬀerentiable at each interior point (K,L); moreover,
limK→∞D1F (K,L) = 0 for each given L > 0.
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4.2 Competitive Equilibrium
The present model contemplates several deviations from a frictionless world and so a competitive
equilibrium cannot usually be recast as the solution to an optimal planning program. The model
includes individual uninsurable shocks to preferences and labor, capital income taxes, and an ag-
gregate shock to production. Households can hold capital to transfer wealth, but they may be
unable to smooth out consumption since there is only one single asset and capital holdings must be
non-negative.
Definition 4.1 A sequential competitive equilibrium (SCE) is a tax function τk(K), and a collec-
tion of vectors
¡©
cit(zt), kit+1(z
t)
ª
i ,Kt+1(z
t), Lt(zt), wt(zt), rt(zt)
¢
t≥0 that satisfy the following con-
ditions:
(i) Constrained utility maximization: For each household i, the sequence
¡
cit, kit+1
¢
t≥0 maximizes
the objective (4.1) subject to the sequence of budget constraints (4.2).
(ii) Profit maximization: For each zt, vector (Kt(zt−1), Lt(zt)) maximizes profits (4.3).
(iii) Market clearing: For each zt and its predecessor node zt−1,
Kt+1
¡
zt
¢
+
IX
i=1
cit
¡
zt
¢
= AtF
¡
Kt
¡
zt−1
¢
, Lt
¡
zt
¢¢
+ (1− δ)Kt
¡
zt−1
¢
+
IX
i=1
eit
¡
zt
¢
,
IX
i=1
kit
¡
zt−1
¢
= Kt
¡
zt−1
¢
and
IX
i=1
li (zt) = Lt
¡
zt
¢
.
Note that the equilibrium quantities
¡
Kt+1(zt), Lt(zt)
¢
t≥0 may be inferred from households’ ag-
gregate supply of these factors. Hence, we may refer to a SCE as simply a sequence of vectors¡©
cit(zt), kit+1(z
t)
ª
i , rt(z
t), wt(zt)
¢
t≥0. There does not seem to be a general proof of existence of
competitive equilibria for infinite-horizon economies with distortions. We are aware of a related
contribution by Jones and Manuelli (1999), but their analysis is not directly applicable to models
with incomplete markets or externalities. Hence, Appendix A outlines a proof of the following result.
Proposition 4.2 A SCE exists.
For computational purposes we need to bound the equilibrium values of the key variables of
the model. Let us assume that the vector of endowments, e(zt), is positive and follows a time
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homogeneous Markov chain that depends only on the current realization zt. In Appendix A below
we show that there are positive constantsKmax andKmin such that for every equilibrium sequence of
physical capital vectors
¡
kit+1(z
t))
¢
t≥0 ifK
max ≥
PI
i=1 k
i
0(z
0) ≥ Kmin thenKmax ≥
PI
i=1 k
i
t+1(z
t) ≥
Kmin for all zt. Moreover, Kmin > 0 if limK→0D1F (K,L) = ∞ for some positive L. Hence, in
what follows the domain of aggregate capital will be restricted to the interval [Kmin,Kmax], and
it should be understood that Kmin = 0 only if limK→0D1F (K,L) is bounded for all given L > 0.
This implies that every equilibrium sequence of factor prices
¡
rt(zt), wt(zt)
¢
t≥0 is bounded.
We also need to bound the equilibrium shadow values of investment. To accomplish this task, we
define an auxiliary value function of an individual sequential optimization problem. For a given se-
quence of factor prices and aggregate capital (r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0)) =
¡
rt(zt), wt(zt),Kt+1
¡
zt
¢¢
t≥0,
let
J i(ki0, z0, r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0)) = maxE
∞X
t=0
βtui(ct(zt), zt)
s.t.
kit+1
¡
zt
¢
+ cit
¡
zt
¢
= (1− δ) kit
¡
zt−1
¢
+
(1− τk(Kt
¡
zt
¢
))rt
¡
zt
¢
kit
¡
zt−1
¢
+
+wt
¡
zt
¢
lit + e
i
t + T
i
t
¡
zt
¢
+ πit,
kit+1
¡
zt
¢
≥ 0, ki0 given.
For every bounded sequence (r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0)), the value function J
i(ki0, z0, r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0))
is well defined, and continuous. Moreover, mapping J i(·, z0, r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0)) is increasing,
concave, and diﬀerentiable with respect to the initial condition ki0. Further, the partial derivative
D1J i(ki0, z0, r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0)) varies continuously with (k
i
0, r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0)) [cf. Rincon-
Zapatero and Santos (2009)]. The next result readily follows from these regularity properties of the
value function.
Proposition 4.3 For all SCE
¡©
cit(zt), kit+1(z
t)
ª
i , rt(z
t), wt(zt)
¢
t≥0 with K
max ≥
PI
i=1 k
i
0(z
0) ≥
Kmin, there is a constant γ such that 0 ≤ D1J i(ki0, z0, r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0)) ≤ γ for all zt.
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Observe that these bounds apply to the following types of utility functions: (i) Both function
u(·, z) and its derivative are bounded; (ii) function u(·, z) is bounded, and its derivative function is
unbounded; and (iii) both function u(·, z) and its derivative are unbounded. Phelan and Stacchetti
(2001) deal with case (i) and Krebs (2004) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003) consider utility
functions of type (iii). We provide a uniform method of proof that covers all three cases, as well
as production functions with bounded and unbounded derivatives. As a matter of fact, Proposition
4.3 fills an important gap in the literature, since no general results are available on upper and
lower bounds for factor prices and marginal utilities for production economies with heterogeneous
consumers and market frictions.
For any initial distribution of capital k0 and a given shock z0, we define the Markov equilibrium
correspondence V ∗ : K × Z → RI+ as
V ∗ (k0, z0) =
( ¡· · · ,D1J i(ki0, z0, r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0)), · · · ¢ :¡©
cit(zt), kit+1(z
t)
ª
i , rt, wt
¢
t≥0 is a SCE
)
, (4.4)
where K = {k : Kmax ≥ PIi=1 ki ≥ Kmin}. Hence, the set V ∗ (k0, z0) contains all current equilib-
rium shadow values of investment returns m0 =
¡· · · ,mi0, · · · ¢, for every household i.
Corollary 4.4 Correspondence V ∗ is non-empty, compact-valued, and upper semicontinuous.
This corollary is a straightforward consequence of Propositions 4.2 and 4.3. Note that by the en-
velope theorem we must haveD1J i(ki0, z0, r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0)) ≥ (1−δ+(1−τk)r0(z0))D1ui(ci0, z0),
with equality when c0i > 0. Moreover, Proposition 4.3 implies 0 ≤ D1J i(ki0, z0, r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0)) ≤
γ, and so ci0 = 0 is possible only if the derivative of the utility function u
i is bounded at ci0 = 0.
We now define operator B, which is another key element in our analysis. Let λi(zt) denote the
multiplier associated to constraint kit+1
¡
zt
¢
≥ 0. For any given correspondence V : K × Z → RI+,
let B (V ) (k, z) be the set of values m = (· · · ,mi, · · · ), with 0 ≤ mi ≤ γ for all i, such that there is
some vector (c, k+, r, w,m+, λ) ∈ RI+ ×RI+ ×R+ ×R+ ×
¡
RI+
¢N ×RI+, with m+ (z+) ∈ V (k+, z+)
for all z+ ∈ Z that satisfies all individual and aggregate temporary equilibrium conditions (2.4). It
should be observed that Theorems 2.1, 3.1, and 3.2 hold for V ∗ and B.
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4.3 Numerical Example 1: A Model with Capital Income Taxes
Let us first consider a deterministic version of the above model with a representative agent and
capital income taxes. To further simplify our analysis, assume that capital is the only production
factor with full depreciation δ = 1, and the utility function is logarithmic. Let
f(k) = k1/3, β = 0.95. (4.5)
Assume that there is a piecewise linear tax schedule
τ(K) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0.10 if K ≤ 0.160002
0.05− 10(K − 0.165002) if 0.160002 ≤ K ≤ 0.170002
0 if K ≥ 0.170002.
(4.6)
Then, a continuous Markov equilibrium fails to exist [cf. Santos (2002, Prop. 3.4)]. Note that,
by the foregoing analysis a recursive equilibrium does exist in an adequately expanded state space.
Implementation of our algorithm
Following the notation of our general theoretical framework, we can write:
ϕ(kt+1, ct) = f(kt)− ct − kt+1, and (4.7)
mt = h(kt, ct) =
rt (1− τ(kt))
ct
=
1
3k
−2/3
t (1− τ(kt))
ct
. (4.8)
Similarly, aggregate feasibility and the intertemporal optimality conditions for the household can be
summarized by the Euler equation
Φ(kt, ct,mt+1) =
1
ct
− βmt+1. (4.9)
Then, let B(V )(kt) be the set of valuesmt such that there is (ct, kt+1) and mt+1 ∈ V (kt+1) satisfying
the temporary equilibrium conditions (4.7)-( 4.9).
For the numerical implementation of our algorithm we exploit the low dimensionality of the
state space and compactness of the equilibrium correspondence. Specifically, for each given kt the
shadow values of investment, m(kt), lie in a compact interval [m(kt) ,m (kt)]. Hence, our numerical
algorithm starts by approximating the upper and lower bound functions m(kt) and m (kt) using
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step functions. Notice, however, that these functions may be discontinuous. Hence, the standard
strategy of approximating these functions only at the vertex points of the triangulation may not
work. In our case, it is necessary to obtain bounds for all values within each of the simplices. Some
technical details are relegated to Appendix B. Here, we simply illustrate some properties of our
numerical approximation.
The left-hand side panel of Figure 4.1 presents our initial guess for the upper and lower approx-
imated functions m(kt) and m (kt), for V
h,N
0 . Then, the right-hand side panel contains successive
approximations under the application of our operator Bh,N . A useful feature of this example is that
the backward shooting algorithm can be used to obtain highly accurate solutions. (Of course, for
stochastic versions the shooting method no longer works.) The model contains three steady states.
The middle one is unstable with complex roots. The dots in Figure 4.1 represent the approximate
solution.
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Figure 4.1: Initial guess (left grey area) and limiting correspondence (dotted lines).
Note that the limiting correspondence is not single-valued and hence there are multiple equilibria
near the unstable steady-state.
Comparison with other computational algorithms
A standard practice in quantitative analysis is to assume that a continuous policy function exists.
Hence, let
k1 = g(k, ξ),
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where g is a continuous approximation defined by a finite vector of parameters ξ. We obtain an
estimate for ξ by forming an Euler equation system over as many points as the dimensionality of
the parameter space
u0(ki, g(ki, ξ)) = βu0(g(ki, ξ), g(g(ki, ξ), ξ)) · £f 0(g(ki, ξ))(1− τ(g(ki, ξ))) + (1− δ)¤ .
The choice of the grid points, ki, for the Euler equation may be dependent on the functional approx-
imations for the policy function (e.g., Chebyshev polynomials could be evaluated at the Chebyshev
nodes). Here, we assume that g(ki, ξ) belongs to the class of piecewise linear functions. First, we
note that this approximation failed to converge in several instances. In particular, we found that
vector ξ could oscillate with no discernible pattern across diﬀerent iterations. As expected, the area
of the domain where the lack of convergence occurred was close to the middle steady state. Figure
4.2 displays some representative functions from diﬀerent iterations of the algorithm. Second, in
some other cases the distance between candidate policy functions was relatively small, but this does
not mean that these policies are close to the true solution. Of course, for points near the middle
steady-state solution, a continuous policy function will arbitrarily redirect the convergence of initial
conditions to one of the remaining two competitive steady-states solutions.
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Figure 4.2: Diﬀerent iterations of a standard solution method and our algorithm.
In summary, the equilibrium correspondence of this model cannot be represented by a continuous
law of motion. Traditional computational methods based on iterations of continuous functions may
either fail to converge or yield inaccurate solutions that highly distort the dynamics of competitive
equilibria.
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4.4 Numerical Example 2: A Model with Two Agents and no Taxes
We now consider a specification of the model with two agents who face idiosyncratic and aggregate
uncertainty. There are no taxes. Both agents have the same utility function, ui(ci) = (
ci)
1−σ
1−σ , with
discount factor, β1 = β2 = 0.95. The capital share is α = 0.34 and depreciation rate δ = 0.06.
Total factor productivity is a random variable with two possible values: Ag = 1.01 and Ab = 0.99.
Each agent has a random endowment of labor, li, which can take two possible values, lb = 0 and
lg = 1. These idiosyncratic shocks do not aﬀect the aggregate labor supply; that is, l1t + l2t = 1 at
all date-events. Productivity and labor endowments are assumed to be jointly driven by a Markov
process with transition matrix
Π =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0.5 0.4 0.06 0.04
0.6 0.3 0.06 0.04
0.45 0.35 0.15 0.05
0.5 0.3 0.15 0.05
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
Here, entry Πp,q is the probability of moving to state p from the current state q. Note there are four
possible states (Ag, lg, lb), (Ag, lb, lg), (Ab, lg, lb), and (Ab, lb, lg).
Implementation of our algorithm
Mapping this model into the notation of our general theoretical framework is simple. The vector
of endogenous predetermined variables is given by the capital holdings of each agent, xt = (k1t , k2t ),
while the vector of current endogenous variables contains the consumption and investment choices
of each agent, yt = (c1t , c2t , i1t , i2t ). Equilibrium interest rates and wages can be explicitly written in
terms of the aggregate capital Kt and unit labor supply. Hence, capital and the shadow multipliers
for investment are determined by the following equations
ϕ(xt+1, xt, yt, zt) = (i1t + (1− δ)k1t − k1t+1, i2t + (1− δ)k2t − k2t+1), (4.10)¡
m1t ,m
2
t
¢
= h(xt, yt, zt) = ((rt + 1− δ)
¡
c1t
¢−σ , (rt + 1− δ) ¡c2t ¢−σ). (4.11)
with rt = θAtKθ−1t , wt = (1− θ)AtKθt . Finally, intertemporal optimality and all individual and
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aggregate constraints are collected in a function Φ. That is, Φ(xt, yt, zt, Et[mt+1]) = 0 means that
(rt + 1− δ) kit + wtlit − cit − iit = 0, (4.12)¡
cit
¢−σ − βEtmit+1(zt+1) + λit = 0 for i = 1, 2,X
i
(cit + i
i
t)−AtKθt = 0,
where λit is the multiplier associated to the constraint kit+1 ≥ 0.
Our algorithm operates as follows. Let V be any given correspondence, then BV (x, z) is the
set of all shadow values of the marginal returns to investment
¡
m1t ,m2t
¢
for which one can find
c1t , c2t , i1t , i2t , k1t+1, k
2
t+1, and
¡
m1t+1 (zt+1) ,m
2
t+1 (zt+1)
¢
∈ V (k1t+1, k2t+1, zt+1) at all successors zt+1 that
satisfy equations (4.10)-(4.12). Appendix B provides further details of the operation of this algorithm
that considers multiple agents.
Comparison with other computational algorithms
A commonly used method to solve this type of models is the "approximate aggregation" proce-
dure pioneered by Krusell and Smith (1998). A key insight of this method is that in equilibrium
aggregate variables may be well approximated as functions of simple statistics. In particular, the
stochastic process driving aggregate capital is assumed to be characterized by a finite vector of mo-
ments. Individual decisions are computed on the basis of such expectations for aggregate variables.
Finally, a fixed point is reached if the simulated moments from the individual decision rules match
those of the law of motion for aggregate capital.
In our baseline model, the algorithm is applied in the following way. Start with a guess on a
parameterized functional form for the law of motion of aggregate capital. Then, use value function
to compute the problem of the representative household
ν(ki;K, z) = max{ui(c) + βE[ν(k0i;K 0, z0)|z, ε]} (4.13)
s.t. c+ ki0 = r(K, z)ki + w(K, z)εi + (1− δ)ki
ki0 ≥ B
logKt+1 = a(z) logKt + b(z) (4.14)
The algorithm estimates coeﬃcients (a(zg), b(zg), a(zb), b(zb)) and individual policy functions in the
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following fashion: (i) Start with initial parameter estimates; (ii) Solve the dynamic programming
problem (4.13) for each agent; (iii) Construct aggregate capital time series by aggregating the
resulting individual time series simulations; (iv) Perform a regression over the stationary region to
obtain new estimates for such coeﬃcients. If there is no variation in the coeﬃcient estimates, and
the R2 and standard error of the aforementioned regression are suﬃciently good, then the process
stops.
An obvious advantage of “approximate aggregation" is computational cost. Indeed, the algorithm
can accommodate an arbitrary number of agents and idiosyncratic shocks. Surprisingly, relatively
little is known about the accuracy properties of the solutions and of the simulated moments for
this type of algorithms. In Table 4.4, we compare some quantitative properties of the “approximate
aggregation" method described above to those of our algorithm. In this table, EEi denotes the
value of the Euler equation, and Mean(ki) is the average of simulated capital values for each agent
i = 1, 2.
Method Mean( |EE1| ) Mean( |EE2| ) Mean(k1) Mean (k2)
Approx. Aggregation 1.57× 10−2 2.71× 10−2 2.8196 4.5210
Our Algorithm 5.14× 10−4 7.58× 10−4 3.0898 3.8623
Table 4.4: Euler equation residuals and simulated moments of alternative solution methods.
Even though in this case the model always has a unique competitive equilibrium that may be
generated by a continuous policy function, we can see that our method yields higher accuracy
of approximation as measured by Euler equation residuals. Further, our nonlinear equilibrium
approximation results in substantially diﬀerent simulated statistics for individual wealth than those
acquired by the approximate aggregation method. Indeed, approximation errors for these simple
moments are of the order of 10 percent.
5 A Stochastic Overlapping Generations Economy
OLG models have become instrumental in the analysis of several macro issues, such as the funding
of social security, the optimal profile of savings and investment over the life cycle, the eﬀects of
various fiscal and monetary policies, and the evolution of future interest rates and asset prices under
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current demographic trends.6
As already stressed, there are no known convergent procedures for the computation of sequential
competitive equilibria in OLG models even for frictionless economies with complete financial mar-
kets. We now illustrate that our approach delivers a reliable, computable algorithm for the solution
of competitive equilibria in a general class of OLG models.
5.1 Economic Environment
The economy is conformed by a sequence of overlapping generations that live for two periods. The
primitive characteristics of the economy are defined by a stationary Markov chain. At every time
period t = 0, 1, 2, · · · , a new generation is born. Each generation is made up of I agents, who are
present in the economy for two periods. More specifically, for a household of type i born at time
t, preferences are defined over consumption bundles of the goods available at times t and t + 1,
and the agent can trade goods and assets only in these two periods. The economy starts with an
initial generation who is present only in the initial period t = 0. This generation is endowed with
the aggregate supply of assets θ0. At each node zt, there exist spot markets for the consumption
good and J securities. These securities are specified by the current vector of prices, qt(zt) =
(· · · , qjt (zt), · · · ), and the vectors of future dividends dr(zr) = (· · · , djr(zr), · · · ) promised to deliver
at future information sets zr|zt for r > t. We assume that the vector of security prices qt(zt) is
non-negative — a condition implied by free disposal of securities — and the vector of dividends dt(zt)
is positive in all components and depends only on the current realization of the vector of shocks zt;
hence, (dt(zt))t≥0 is a time-invariant Markov chain.
For simplicity, we assume that every utility function U i is separable over consumption of diﬀerent
dates. For an agent i born in period t, let ciy,t
¡
zt
¢
denote the consumption of the aggregate good
in period t over the history of shocks zt, and let cio,t+1
¡
zt+1|zt¢ denote the consumption in period
t+ 1 for every successor node zt+1|zt of zt. Then the intertemporal objective U i is defined as
U i
¡
ciy, c
i
0; z
t, zt+1
¢
= ui
¡
ciy,t
¡
zt
¢
, zt
¢
+ β
X
zt+1∈Z
vi
¡
cio,t+1
¡
zt+1
¢
, zt+1
¢
π
¡
zt+1|zt¢ . (5.1)
6For instance, see Champ and Freeman (2002), Conesa and Krueger (1999), Geanakoplos, Magill and Quinzii (2003),
Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995), Storelesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004),
and Ventura (1999).
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The one-period utilities ui and vi satisfy the following conditions:
Assumption 5.1 For each z ∈ Z the one-period utility functions vi(·, z), ui(·, z) : R+ → R∪{−∞}
are increasing, strictly concave, and continuous. These functions are also continuously diﬀerentiable
at every interior point c > 0.
Each agent i born at t = 1, 2, · · · is endowed with a vector of goods eit = (eiy,t, eio,t+1) and
trades an asset portfolio θi to attain desirable amounts of consumption. The endowment process
(eit(zt)) = (eiy,t(zt), eio,t+1(z
t+1|zt)) follows a time-invariant Markov chain; hence, eiy,t(zt) = eiy(zt),
and eio,t+1(z
t+1|zt) = eio(zt+1) for every agent i and every t. Given prices
¡
qt
¡
zt
¢¢
t≥0 , a consumption-
savings plan (ciy,t
¡
zt
¢
, cio,t+1
¡
zt+1
¢
, θit
¡
zt
¢
) must obey the following two-period budget constraints:
θit+1
¡
zt
¢ · qt ¡zt¢+ ciy,t ¡zt¢ ≤ eiy,t (zt) , for θit+1 ¡zt¢ ≥ 0, (5.2)
cio,t+1
¡
zt+1
¢
≤ θit+1
¡
zt
¢ · ¡qt+1 ¡zt+1¢+ dt (zt+1)¢+ eio,t+1 (zt+1) , all zt+1|zt. (5.3)
For an initial stock of securities θi0 each agent i at time t = 0 seeks to maximize the total quantity
of consumption cio,0(z0) for given endowments of the aggregate good e
i
o and the vector of securities
θi0. More precisely,
cio,0 (z0) = θ
i
0 · (q0 (z0) + d0 (z0)) + eio (z0) . (5.4)
5.2 Competitive Equilibrium
In this economy the aggregate commodity endowment is bounded by a portfolio-trading plan [Santos
and Woodford (1997)], and hence asset pricing bubbles cannot exist in a SCE.
Definition 5.1 A SCE is a collection of vectors {¡ciy,t ¡zt¢ , cio,t+1 ¡zt+1|zt¢ , θit+1 ¡zt¢¢Ii=1 , qt ¡zt¢}t≥0
such that
(i) Utility maximization: For every household i and all t, vector (ciy,t
¡
zt
¢
, cio,t+1
¡
zt+1|zt¢ ,
θit+1
¡
zt
¢
) maximizes the objective (5.1) subject to constraints (5.2)-(5.3). For every household i
of the starting generation, cio,0 (z0) satisfies equation (5.4).
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(ii) Market clearing: For each zt,
IX
i=1
¡
ciy,t
¡
zt
¢
+ cio,t
¡
zt
¢¢
=
JX
j=1
djt (zt) +
IX
i=1
¡
eiyt (zt) + e
i
ot (zt)
¢
IX
i=1
θjit+1
¡
zt
¢
= 1, j = 1, · · · , J.
Note that to circumvent technical issues concerning existence of a SCE, we still maintain the
short-sale constraint θt ≥ 0 for all t. Then, the existence of a SCE can be established by stan-
dard methods [e.g., Balasko and Shell (1980), and Schmachtenberg (1988)]. Moreover, by similar
arguments used by these authors it is easy to show that every sequence of equilibrium asset prices
(qt
¡
zt
¢
)t≥0 is bounded.
Then, we define the Markov equilibrium correspondence V ∗ : Θ× Z → RJI++ as follows:
V ∗ (θ0, z0) =
n³
...
³
qj0 (z0) + d
j
0 (z0)
´
D1vi
¡
ci0 (z0) , z0
¢
...
´
: (cy, co, θ, q) is a SCE
o
.
From the above results on the existence of SCE for OLG economies, we obtain
Proposition 5.2 Correspondence V ∗ is nonempty, compact-valued, and upper semicontinuous.
5.3 Numerical Example: A Monetary Model
We consider a simplified version of the OLG model with money based on Benhabib and Day (1982)
and Grandmont (1985). This simple model is useful for computation because it can be solved with
arbitrary accuracy. Hence, it is possible to compare the true solution of the model with other
numerical approximations. Extensions to a stochastic environment are easy to handle with our
algorithm but may become problematic with other algorithms.
Each individual receives an endowment e1 of the perishable good when young and e2 when old.
There is a single asset, money, that pays zero dividends at each given period. The initial old agent
is endowed with the existing money supply M. Let Pt be the price level at time t. An agent born in
period t chooses consumption c1t when young, c2t+1 when old, and money holdings Mt to solve
maxu (c1t) + βv (c2t+1)
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subject to
c1t +
Mt
Pt
= e1,
c2t+1 = e2 +
Mt
Pt+1
.
A sequential competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of prices (Pt)t≥0, and sequences
of consumption and money holdings {c1t, c2t+1,Mt}t≥0 such that an individual solves the budget-
constrained utility maximization problem and markets clear:
c1t + c2t = e1 + e2, and Mt =M for all t.
A sequential competitive equilibrium can be characterized by the following first-order condition:
1
Pt
u0
µ
e1 −
M
Pt
¶
=
1
Pt+1
βv0
µ
e2 +
M
Pt+1
¶
.
Let bt =M/Pt be real money balances at t. Then,
btu0 (e1 − bt) = bt+1βv0 (e2 + bt+1) .
Hence, all competitive equilibria can be generated by an oﬀer curve in the (bt, bt+1) space. A simple
recursive equilibrium would be described by a function g such that bt+1 = g (bt) .
Let us now restrict attention to the following parameterizations:
u (c) = c0.45, v (c) = −1
7
c−7, β = 0.8,
M = 1, e1 = 2, and e2 = 26/7 − 21/7. For this simple example, the oﬀer curve is backward bend-
ing. Hence, the equilibrium correspondence is multivalued, and standard methods — based on the
computation of a continuous equilibrium function bt+1 = g (bt) — may portray a partial view of the
equilibrium dynamics. The solution is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Implementation of our algorithm.
Note that the implementation our numerical algorithm of Section 3 is fairly straightforward. In
fact, since the shadow values of the marginal returns to investment lie in a compact subset of R, we
can follow the same computational steps as in the growth model of the previous section. For this
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Figure 5.1: The oﬀer curve.
example, we find that the policy correspondence and time series from our method generate an Euler
equation residual of order 10−6, so that the solution obtained with our algorithm is indistinguishable
from the “exact” solution.
Comparison with other computational algorithms
A common practice in OLG models is to start the search with an equilibrium guess function
b0 = g (b, ξ) defined by a finite vector of parameters ξ, and then iterate over the temporary equi-
librium conditions. We applied such a procedure to our model. Depending on the initial guess,
we find that either the upper or the lower part of the oﬀer curve would emerge as a fixed point.
This strong dependence on initial conditions is a rather undesirable feature of this computational
method. In particular, note that for initial conditions where the method yields the lower part of
the actual equilibrium correspondence all competitive equilibria converge to autarchy. Indeed, zero
real monetary holdings are the unique absorbing steady state associated with the lower part of the
equilibrium correspondence. Hence, even in the deterministic version of the model, we need a global
approximation of the equilibrium correspondence to analyze the various predictions of the model.
As shown in Figure 5.2, the approximate equilibrium correspondence has a cyclical equilibrium in
which real money holdings oscillate between 0.8529 and 0.0953. It is also known that the model has
a three-period cycle. However, if we iterate only over the upper part of the upper curve, we find
that money holdings converge monotonically to M¯p = 0.4181 (as illustrated by the dashed line of
Figure 5.2). As a matter of fact, the upper part of the equilibrium correspondence is monotonic,
and can at most have cycles of period two, whereas the model generates many equilibrium cycles of
various periodicities.
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Figure 5.2: Time-series behavior of diﬀerent numerical solutions.
In conclusion, for OLG economies, standard computational methods based on iteration of con-
tinuous functions do not guarantee convergence to the equilibrium solutions and may miss some
important properties of the equilibrium dynamics.
6 Asset Pricing Models with Incomplete Markets
An important family of macroeconomic models incorporates financial frictions in the form of sequen-
tially incomplete markets, borrowing constraints, transactions costs, cash-in-advance constraints,
and margin and collateral requirements. These models are commonly used to assess the eﬀects
of monetary policies, and the variability of macroeconomic aggregates, such as asset prices, con-
sumption, interest rates, and inflation.7 Fairly general conditions rule out the existence of financial
bubbles in these economies, and hence equilibrium asset prices are determined by the expected value
of future dividends [Santos and Woodford (1997)]. This section illustrates the applicability of our
proposed algorithm in a model with collateral requirements from Kubler and Schmmeders (2003).
6.1 Economic Environment
The economy is populated by a finite number of agents. At each date, agents can trade quantities of
the unique aggregate good and a fixed set of assets spanning the horizon of the economy. There are
various financial frictions: Incomplete markets, collateral requirements, and short-sale constraints.
7For instance, see Campbell (1999), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Huggett (1993), Krebs and Wilson (2004), Mankiw
(1986), and Telmer (1993). For some monetary models, see Bewley (1980), and Lucas (1982).
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Each agent i maximizes the intertemporal objective
E
" ∞X
t=0
¡
βi
¢t ui ¡cit¢
#
, (6.1)
subject to a sequence of budget constraints. We assume that βi ∈ (0, 1), and ui is strictly increasing,
strictly concave, and continuously diﬀerentiable with derivative
¡
ui
¢0
(0) = ∞. At each node zt,
there exist spot markets for the consumption good and J securities. These securities are specified
by the current vector of prices, qt(zt) = (· · · , qjt (zt), · · · ), and the vectors of dividends d(zr) =
(· · · , dj(zr), · · · ) promised to deliver at future information sets zr|zt for r > t. The vector of
security prices qt(zt) is non-negative, and the vector of dividends dt(zt) is positive and depends
only on the current realization of the vector of shocks zt. Also, at each node zt the agent receives
ei(zt) > 0 units of the consumption good.
There is a market for one-period bonds available at all times. A bond is a promise to one unit of
the consumption good at all successor nodes zt+1|zt. Bonds are in zero net supply, and are specified
by the price vector pt(zt). Agents can default on bond payments, and hence they are required to
hold at least kj ≥ 0 units worth of each security j as collateral. In case of default, the buyer of the
bond will garnish the collateral wealth.
For a given price process
¡
qt
¡
zt
¢
, pt
¡
zt
¢¢
t≥0 , each agent i chooses desired quantities of con-
sumption, real securities and bond holdings (cit
¡
zt
¢
, θit+1
¡
zt
¢
, φit+1(zt))t≥0 subject to the following
sequence of budget constraints:
cit
¡
zt
¢
+ φit+1(z
t)pt(zt) + θit+1
¡
zt
¢ · qt ¡zt¢ = (6.2)
= ei (zt) + φit(z
t−1)min
⎧
⎨
⎩1,
X
j
kj
qjt (z
t)
qjt−1(zt−1)
⎫
⎬
⎭+ θ
i
t
¡
zt−1
¢ · ¡qt ¡zt¢+ d (zt)¢ ,
−kjφit+1(zt) ≤ q
j
t (z
t)θijt+1(z
t), for j = 1..J, (6.3)
0 ≤ θit+1
¡
zt
¢
, all zt, θi0 given. (6.4)
Note that constraint (6.3) limits the amount of bond debt to a fraction of collateral wealth, and
constraint (6.4) imposes non-negative holdings of real securities. The multipliers associated to these
constraints will be denoted by γi
¡
zt
¢
and λi(zt), respectively. The minimum in expression (6.2)
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reflects that it is optimal to default on previous bond short-sales whenever the promised payment is
larger than the cost of losing the collateral. Hence, agents must know node zt−1 prices when making
optimal choices at node zt.
6.2 Competitive Equilibrium
Definition 6.1 A sequential competitive equilibrium (SCE) for this economy is a collection of vec-
tors (ct
¡
zt
¢
, θt+1
¡
zt
¢
, φt+1(zt), pt(zt), qt
¡
zt
¢
)t≥0 such that (i) for each agent i the plan (cit
¡
zt
¢
,
θit+1
¡
zt
¢
, φit+1(zt))t≥0 maximizes the objective (6.1) subject to constraints(6.2)-(6.4), and (ii) mar-
kets clear:
IX
i
cit
¡
zt
¢
=
JX
j
dj (zt) +
IX
i
eit
¡
zt
¢
, (6.5)
IX
i
θjit+1
¡
zt
¢
= 1, for j = 1, · · · , J, (6.6)
IX
i
φit+1
¡
zt
¢
= 0, at all zt. (6.7)
For the recursive specification of equilibria the state space includes the space of exogenous
shocks, Z; the space of possible values for share prices, Q; and the distributions of share Θ =n
θ ∈ RJI+ :
PI
i=1 θ
ji = 1 for all j
o
and bond holdings ∆ =
n
φ ∈ RI+ :
PI
i=1 φ
i = 0
o
. Note that the
optimal default choice at any given node of the uncertainty tree requires knowledge of last, current
period, and expected future values for asset prices. We will denote by (q−, q, q+) the corresponding
triple of vectors.
The equilibrium shadow value correspondence V ∗ : Q × Θ × ∆ × Z → RJI+ for this model is
defined as
V ∗ (q−, θ0, φ0, z0) =
n³
...,
³
qj0 (z0) + d
j (z0)
´ ¡
ui
¢0 ¡ci0 (z0)¢ , ...´ : ¡ct, θt+1, φt+1, qt, pt, λt, γt¢t≥0 is a SCEo .
Observe that, for every (q−, θ0, φ0, z0) , the set V ∗ (q−, θ0, φ0, z0) contains all equilibrium JI-vectors
m0 = (· · · ,mji0 , · · · ) of shadow values of the marginal return to investment on each asset j for
every agent i. Finally, we can define operator B : V 7−→ B (V ) as follows: For each (q−, θ, φ, z) ∈
Q×Θ×∆× Z, the set B (V ) (q−, θ, φ, z) contains all values m = (· · · ,mji+, · · · ) such that there is
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some vector
¡
c, θ+, φ+, q, q+, p, λ, γ
¢
satisfying all the temporary equilibrium conditions with m+ =³
...,mji+ (z+) , ...
´
∈ V
¡
q, θ+, φ+, z+
¢
for each z+ ∈ Z.
Under similar regularity conditions Kubler and Schmedders (2003) show existence of a compet-
itive equilibrium. Building on the previous literature we can then derive the following result.
Proposition 6.2 Correspondence V ∗ is nonempty, compact-valued, and upper semicontinuous.
We now illustrate an application of our algorithm for a model with two agents and two assets.
6.3 A Numerical Example
There are two infinitely lived agents i = 1, 2, and a real security that generates a sequence of random
dividends. Following Kubler and Schmedders (2003), we choose the auxiliary variable,
ω =
θq + φmin
n
1, k q+q
o
q
.
Then, the set of predetermined variables is reduced to xt = (ωt, θt, φt) . Further, budget constraints
also simplify to
c1t = e
1
t + ωtqt + θt (dt − qt)− φtpt (6.8)
c2t = e
2
t + (1− ωt) qt + (1− θt) (dt − qt) + φtpt (6.9)
0 ≤ θt ≤ 1.
With this simplification it is no longer necessary to keep track of last-period or next-period prices.
This change of variable is actually not needed for our methods but it will speed up computations.
Implementation of our algorithm
Under the above change of variable, it is easier to consider the related shadow value
mˆit ≡ (qt)
¡
ui
¢0
(cit). (6.10)
From the above definition and the individual constraints (6.8)-(6.9), we can solve for θt and qt as
functions of mˆ1t , mˆ2t , xt, pt, φt. Hence, given a correspondence V , we have that
¡
mˆ1t , mˆ2t
¢
will belong
to BV if we can find bond holdings φt, prices (pt, qt+1) , a wealth level, ωt+1, multipliers
¡
λit, γit
¢
,
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and continuation values for the shadow investment values
¡
mˆ1 (zt+1) , mˆ2 (zt+1)
¢
∈ V (xt+1, zt+1) for
all successor nodes that satisfy the individual budget constraints and the intertemporal optimality
conditions:
(dt − qt)
¡
ui
¢0 ¡cit¢+ βEtmi (zt+1) + qtγit + λit = 0 (6.11)
−pt
¡
ui
¢0
+ βEt
∙
k
qt
mi (zt+1) |ΩA
¸
+ βEt
∙
mi (zt+1)
qt+1
|ΩB
¸
+ kγit = 0, (6.12)
where ΩA =
n
(qt, qt+1) : min
n
1, k qt+1qt
o
= k qt+1qt
o
, ΩB =
n
(qt, qt+1) : min
n
1, k qt+1qt
o
= 1
o
, and
ωt+1 =
θtqt+1 + φtmin
n
1, k qt+1qt
o
qt+1
. (6.13)
Comparison with other computational algorithms
Kubler and Schmedders (2003) enlarge the state space with all exogenous and endogenous vari-
ables, as well as the wealth distribution. Recursive equilibrium is constructed from a correspondence
that maps the enlarged state space into the set of all endogenous variables. As is well known, the
computational cost of approximating a set operator grows exponentially in the dimension of the
domain and range of the operator. Hence, their method seems harder to implement numerically,
and in the end these authors proceed with a computational algorithm that iterates over functions
from the enlarged state space into the set of all endogenous variables. Unfortunately, iteration over
functions does not guarantee convergence to the equilibrium correspondence, and can identify only
one equilibrium at a time. In contrast, our proposed algorithm constructs recursive equilibria from
an operator that maps equilibrium points to next period equilibrium points using the shadow val-
ues of investment. This is a lower dimensional object that makes the algorithm more amenable to
computation.
To illustrate the performance of our algorithm, assume both agents have identical utilities u =
c1−σ
1−σ , with a common coeﬃcient of risk aversion of σ = 2 and β1 = β2 = 0.95. There are four
possible values for the aggregate endowment, e ∈ (9.9, 10.5, 9.9, 10.5), with dividends d = 0.3 ·e, and
individual endowments:
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e1 ∈ (1.386, 2.205, 5.544, 5.145),
e2 = 0.7 e− e1.
Also, the transition matrix driving individual shocks is given by
Π(z0|z) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1
0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1
0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4
0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
We simulate the economy using the decision rules obtained from our method and from the
algorithm based on backward iteration over continuous functions. The resulting simulated statistics
are summarized in Table 6.3. As before, EEi denotes the Euler equation residual over the computed
solution and ci is consumption for i = 1, 2.
mean( |EE1| ) mean(|EE2|)
mean c1
(σ (c1))
mean c2
(σ (c2) )
Continuous Markov equilibrium 5.05× 10−6 3.27× 10−8 4.96
(0.78)
5.26
(0.78)
Our algorithm 2.41× 10−5 9.01× 10−6 4.96
(0.78)
5.26
(0.78)
Table 6.3: Simulated moments from alternative solution methods.
Note that for this benchmark calibration both methods deliver very similar simulated moments.
Hence, as a straightforward consequence of Theorem 3.1 convergence to a continuous function can
only occur when the equilibrium is always unique. Therefore, we have numerical evidence of unique-
ness of equilibria for the present model. Of course, iterations over a continuous functions may fail
to converge, and for models in which there is no continuous equilibrium selection, this procedure
may lead to poor approximations of the equilibrium dynamics.
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a theoretical framework for the computation and simulation of dynamic competitive-
markets economies in which the welfare theorems may fail to hold because of market frictions or the
existence of an infinite number of generations. We have applied these methods to some macroeco-
nomic models with heterogeneous agents, taxes, sequentially incomplete markets, borrowing limits,
short-sales, and collateral requirements.
For optimal economies, sequential competitive equilibria are generated by a continuous policy
function that is the fixed point solution of a contractive operator. Continuity of the policy function
allows for various methods of approximation and functional interpolation, and it is essential to
validate laws of large numbers for the simulated paths. Moreover, diﬀerentiability and contractive
properties are useful for the derivation of error bounds that can guide the computation process.
But for OLG models and economies with distortions several papers [e.g. Krebs (2004), Kubler
and Polemarchakis (2004), Kubler and Schmedders (2002), and Santos (2002)] have shown that a
continuous Markov equilibrium may not exist. We establish a general result on the existence of
a Markovian equilibrium solution in a suitably expanded space of state variables. We construct a
numerical algorithm that has desirable approximation properties and guarantees convergence of the
moments computed from simulated paths.
There are three main features of our algorithm that should be of interest for quantitative work
in this area. First, the existence of a Markovian competitive equilibrium is obtained in an enlarged
space of state variables. Our choice of the marginal utility values of assets returns is dictated by
computational considerations. This is a minimal addition to the state space to restore existence of a
Markovian equilibrium and with the property that the added variables enter linearly into the Euler
equation. Second, the algorithm iterates in a space of candidate equilibrium sets — rather than
in a space of functions. Iteration over candidate equilibrium sets guarantees convergence to the
fixed-point solution even if Markov equilibria are not continuous. Moreover, we also establish some
desirable approximation properties of the computed solutions. And third, the algorithm provides
a reliable method for model simulation. We resort to a further discretization of the equilibrium
law of motion so that it becomes a Markov chain. It should be stressed that the usual simulation
over a continuum of values cannot be justified on theoretical grounds: The simulated moments may
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fail to converge to the set of moments of the invariant distributions of the model. Other ways to
restore laws of large numbers for the simulated paths of these economies would be by imposing
monotonicity assumptions on the equilibrium dynamics [Santos (2008)] or by expanding artificially
the noise process [e.g., Blume (1979)]. These latter approaches seem to be of more limited economic
interest.
Of course, our methods must face some computational challenges. Iteration over sets is com-
putationally much more costly than iteration over functions. Therefore, the expansion of the state
space along with iteration over sets should certainly be manifested into an additional computational
burden. Our general convergence results also lack error bounds. This lack of accuracy should be
expected because our models cannot be restated as optimization programs, and miss some common
concavity, diﬀerentiability, and contractive properties. In terms of numerical implementation, the
innovative techniques for error estimation proposed by Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin (2003) seem to
be of limited application for our economies. These authors use outer and inner approximations over
convex sets. It is not clear to us that an outer approximation over convex sets will converge to the
convex hull of the equilibrium correspondence. Moreover, inner convex approximations may be hard
to find. Still, these techniques should work well in some applications.
Our analysis can be extended in several directions. For example, in the preceding sections we
considered exogenous short-sales constraints and exogenous borrowing limits. We could incorporate
borrowing constraints that depend on future income [e.g., Miao and Santos (2005)]. These general
borrowing schemes arise in financial models and in the modeling of the public sector to allow for
various types of fiscal policy rules. In most quantitative studies of recursive equilibrium with fiscal
policy, the government must balance the budget in each state of the world. This is a rather strong
assumption. Another extension is to the area of policy games. As our algorithm includes all the
shadow values of investment, it can deal with heterogeneity and market frictions. For example,
we can generalize the model of Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) to include heterogeneous agents and
various types of financial frictions.
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8 Appendix A (Proofs)
In this Appendix we prove some key results formally stated in Sections 2 and 3. For convenience,
we also oﬀer a proof of existence for the model of Section 4, and establish equilibrium bounds. All
remaining results follow from similar arguments.
Proof of Theorem 2.1: Let V0 ⊃ V ∗0 , let Vn = B(Vn−1), n ≥ 1. Consider V UN = ∪∞n=NVn. Then
V UN+1 = B(V
U
N ) and V
U
N+1 ⊂ V UN for all N ≥ 1. It follows that the sequence {V UN } must converge
to a set V U . Further, V U = ∩N=nV UN , for all n ≥ 1, and so V U = B(V U ). We next prove that
V U = V ∗. Indeed, by the monotonicity of operator B we get that V ∗ ⊂ V U ; also, V U ⊂ V ∗ since
every fixed point conforms an equilibrium — given that the transversality conditions are trivially
satisfied in this model. To complete the proof of the theorem, just note that V ∗ ⊂ Vn ⊂ V Un for all
n ≥ 1. Since we have already established that V Un → V ∗, we get that Vn → V ∗.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: (i) Obvious. Operator Bh,N is monotone, V0 ⊇ V ∗ and Bh,N(V ∗) ⊃ V ∗.
(ii) Proof follows similar arguments as in proof of Theoreom 2.1. Actually, it is possible that
V h,Nn ⊂ V ∗,h,N .
(iii) Note that operator Bh,N varies continuously with h and N . Hence, the set of fixed points
of operators Bh,N is an upper semicontinuous correspondence on parameter values h and N . Since
V ∗ ⊂ V ∗,h,N , we get that V ∗,h,N → V ∗ as h→ 0 and N →∞.
Proof of Theorem 3.2: The proof follows directly from Blume (1982), Theorems 2.1 and 3.1.
The sequence of operators {Bh,N,Aγ} converges to B, and the set of fixed points is an upper semi-
continuous correspondence. Moreover, the convexified operator Bcv has a fixed point μ∗ ∈ Bcv(μ∗).
Proof of Proposition 4.2: As in the original work of Bewley (1972), the existence of a SCE
can be established by approximating the infinite-horizon economy by a sequence of finite economies.
This is the strategy followed by Jones and Manuelli (1999), but their proof is incomplete and does
not apply to sequential competitive economies. As is usual in this approximation argument the
hardest part of the proof is to provide upper bounds for equilibrium allocations and prices over all
the finite-horizon economies. These bounds follow from the proof of Proposition 4.3 below.
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Hence, following Jones and Manuelli (1999), we consider the following steps for the proof of
a SCE: (i) Existence of an equilibrium for a finite horizon economy. This result is covered by
the general proofs of existence of competitive equilibria for economies with taxes and externali-
ties of Arrow and Hahn (1971), Mantel (1975), and Shafer and Sonneschein (1976). (ii) Uniform
bounds for equilibrium allocations and prices of finite-horizon economies. As already pointed out,
these bounds are established in Proposition 4.3. (iii) Existence of SEC as a limit point of fi-
nite equilibria. The preceding steps (i) and (ii) guarantee that there is a collection of vectors¡
ct(zt), kt+1(zt),Kt(zt−1), Lt(zt), wt(zt), rt(zt)
¢
that can be obtained as limits of equilibria of finite
economies. It is obvious that for such limiting solution the market clearing conditions must be
satisfied at each zt, and that one period-profits must be maximized. Moreover, for each agent i
the limiting allocation
¡
cit(zt), kit+1(z
t)
¢
must satisfy the sequence of budget constraints (4.2). This
allocation is optimal since the discounted objective (4.1) is continuous in the product topology over
the set of feasible consumption plans
¡
cit
¡
zt
¢¢
t≥0 which are preferred to the endowment allocation¡
eit (zt)
¢
t≥0. This is because feasible consumption plans
¡
cit
¡
zt
¢¢
t≥0 are bounded above (see below)
and the endowment process
¡
eit (zt)
¢
t≥0 is bounded below by a positive quantity.
Proof of Proposition 4.3: We first show that there are positive constants Kmax and Kmin
such that for every equilibrium sequence of physical capital vectors
¡
kit+1(z
t))
¢
t≥0 if K
max ≥PI
i=1 k
i
0(z
0) ≥ Kmin then Kmax ≥
PI
i=1 k
i
t+1(z
t) ≥ Kmin for all zt. The existence of Kmax follows
directly from assumption 4.1. In particular, by assumption 4.1 the marginal productivity of capital
converges to zero as K goes to ∞ for every fixed L > 0. Also, it obvious that Kmin ≥ 0. We now
claim that if limK→0D1F (K,L) = ∞ for some given positive L, then Kmin > 0. For if not, there
is a sequence of equilibrium capitals
¡
kit+1(z
t)
¢
t≥0 such that
PI
i=1 k
i
t(zt+1) is arbitrarily close to 0
for some zt+1. Under the system of budget constraints (4.2), it follows that there is an arbitrarily
small number ε ≥ 0 such that cit(zt) ≥ eit(zt)− ε for every i. Therefore, modulo an arbitrarily small
number the derivative D1u(cit(zt), zt) is bounded by D1u(eit(zt), zt), and D1F (Kt, Lt) is arbitrarily
large. These latter two conditions together are not compatible with utility maximization, since
the existence of Kmax implies that future consumption cit(zr|zt) for r > t is uniformly bounded.
Consequently, if limK→0D1F (K,L) =∞ for some positive L, then Kmin > 0.
Since L takes on a finite number of positive values, our bounds Kmax and Kmin imply that there
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are constants rmax and wmax such that for every equilibrium sequence of factor prices
¡
rit
¡
zt
¢
, wit
¡
zt
¢¢
t≥0
we have 0 ≤ rt(zt) ≤ rmax and 0 ≤ wt(zt) ≤ wmax for all zt. Hence, the value function
J i(ki0, z0, r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0)) is well defined, and as already pointed out the derivative
D1J i(·, z0, r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0)) is continuous in (ki0, r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0)). Moreover, by a simple
notational change it follows from (4.2) that function J i can be rewritten as J i(ai0(z0), z0, r0(z0),
w0(z0),K(z0)), where a
i
0 = e
i
0(z0) + (1− τ) r0ki0. Then we can conclude that
0 ≤ D1J i(ki0, z0, r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0)) ≤ γ, since ei0(z0) is bounded below by a positive number,
and as shown above all feasible vectors (ki0, r0(z0),w0(z0),K(z0)) lie in a compact set.
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9 Appendix B (Computation)
In this appendix we go over some relevant details for the numerical implementation of our method
for the models considered in sections 4-6.
9.1 Algorithm for the Model with Capital Income Taxes
The givens are a family of simplices that partition the state space (in this simple example we
employ N closed intervals of uniform size),
©
Kj
ª
, an initial step valued correspondence V h0 ⊇ V ∗,
and a parameter that determines the accuracy of approximation of the image of the equilibrium
correspondence, μ > 0. Let mK
j
0 and m
Kj
0 be step functions representing the lowest and highest
values of the shadow price of investment according to correspondence V h0 over simplex K
j .
We exploit the low dimensionality of this simple example and compute tight upper and lower
bound functions for the equilibrium correspondence. To do so, we consider a version of operator
Bh,N that generates monotone sequences of step functions that converge to a limit satisfying V ∗(k) ⊆
[m∗K
j
(k), m∗K
j
(k)] for all k. The algorithm works as follows. Initial upper and lower bounds for
the equilibrium correspondence are taken as given. Consider then any element Kj of the state space
partition and the lower bound value mK
j
. Then we test whether there is any k0 ∈ Kj such that
the one period temporal conditions can be satisfied. If the answer is negative, we can postulate a
new candidate lower bound, mK
j
+ μ, over Kj , for some arbitrarily small constant μ. A symmetric
operation is performed for the upper bound. The details are below.
1. For each Kj , we set mK
j
n+1 ≡ Bˆh,NmK
j
n =mK
j
n either if
min
k0∈Kj ,m,m+
¯¯¯¯
¯ 1k1/30 − k1(m) − βm+
¯¯¯¯
¯ = 0 (9.1)
s.t.
m ∈
h
mK
j
Vn ,m
Kj
Vn + μ
i
m+ ∈
h
mK
i
Vn (k1),m
Ki
Vn (k1)
i
for k1 (m) ∈ Ki (9.2)
or if mK
j
n +μ > mK
j
n . If any of these two conditions does not hold, then we set mK
j
n+1 ≡
Bˆh,NmK
j
n =mK
j
n +μ. A symmetric procedure can be used to define mK
j
n+1 ≡ Bˆh,NmK
j
n .
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2. Repeat step 1 until the sequence of functions mK
j
n ,mK
j
n have converged (up to a desired
accuracy level) to their limits m∗K
j
, m∗K .
Note that Bˆh,N is monotone decreasing by construction, and generates a convergent sequence of
compact and convex valued correspondences containing the equilibrium correspondence V ∗.
9.2 Algorithm for the Asset Pricing Model with Two Agents and Incomplete
Markets
We now fill in some further details of implementation of our algorithm in a model with multiple
agents. Observe that, in contrast to the previous example where for each value of the state the
shadow values of investment would lie in a closed interval, here we have that for each value of the
state the shadow values lie in a compact subset of R2.
The asset pricing example of subsection 6.1 has the property that the only variables that take
a continuum of values are the fraction of shares, bonds, and the value of wealth held by agent
1. We denote by
©
Θj
ª
the collection of simplices that partition the set of possible equilibrium
values for these variables. We choose the following representation for correspondences. Let any
correspondence V , its step approximation V h, and μ > 0 be given. Then, C(V h) is constituted by
the smallest collection of boxes of the form
h
mˆ1Θj ,n, mˆ
1
Θj ,n + μ
i
×
h
mˆ2Θj ,n, mˆ
2
Θj ,n + μ
i
that contain V h
at each given Θj . This is possible because our analysis focuses on compact valued correspondences.
The computable version of operator Bh,N works as follows:
1. A initial correspondence C(V h0 ) ⊇ V ∗ is taken as given.
2. Let the current value for the exogenously given variables be given. For a representative element
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h
mˆ1Θj ,n, mˆ
1
Θj ,n + μ
i
associated to C(V h0 ) solve
min
mˆ1,mˆ2,mˆ1
y0 ,mˆ
2
y0
X
i
(
°°°(d− q) ¡ui¢0 ¡ci¢+ βEmˆiy0+qγi+λi°°°+ (9.3)°°°°°−p ¡ui¢0 (ci) + βE
∙
k
q
mˆiy0 |ΩA
¸
+βE
"
mˆiy0
q
|ΩB
#
+kλic
°°°°°)
s.t.¡
mˆ1, mˆ2
¢
∈
h
mˆ1Θj ,n, mˆ
1
Θj ,n+μ
i
×
h
mˆ2Θj ,n, mˆ
2
Θj ,n+μ
i
, (9.4)
for all possible elements
h
mˆ2Θj ,n, mˆ
2
Θj ,n+μ
i
,¡
mˆ1y0 , mˆ
2
y0
¢
∈ C(V h), (9.5)
ω0=
θq0+φmin
n
1, k q
0
q
o
q0
, (9.6)
together with all aggregate and individual constraints,
with ΩA =
n
(q, q0) : min
n
1, k q
0
q
o
= k q
0
q
o
, ΩB =
n
(q, q0) : min
n
1, k q
0
q
o
= 1
o
.
3. If the minimum above is equal to zero then
h
mˆ1Θj ,n, mˆ
1
Θj ,n + μ
i
also belongs to C(V hτ+1) =
Bh,NC(V hτ ), otherwise it is eliminated. A symmetric procedure is done to determine if a
representative element
h
mˆ2Θj ,n, mˆ
2
Θj ,n + μ
i
will be part of C(V hτ+1) = Bh,NC(V hτ ). 8
4. Perform steps 1 and 2 for all values of the exogenously given variables, elements of the state
space partition, and elements in C(V h).
5. Increase τ by one, and repeat steps 1-3 until convergence in the sequence
n
V h,Nτ
o
is achieved.
8The only change required is that constraint (9.4) must be changed to
(mˆ1, mˆ2)∈
k
m1Θj ,n,m
1
Θj ,n+μ
l
×
k
m2Θj ,n,m
2
Θj ,n+μ
l
, for all possible elements
k
m1Θj ,n,m
1
Θj ,n+μ
l
.
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